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Abstract
Frequent shifts in policy on fertiliser markets have occurred in Ethiopia with the aim of facilitating both physical and
economic access of farmers to fertiliser. The last shift was the introduction of a monopoly on each stage of the supply
chain in 2008. Furthermore, government control of prices and margins as well as stockholding programmes are also
present on the markets. This paper evaluates the effect of these policies on the integration of domestic with world
markets of fertiliser, using cointegration methods. Time series data of diammonium phosphate (DAP) and urea prices
on world, import and retail markets between 1971 and 2012 are used. The findings show high transmission of price
signals from world markets to import prices for both DAP and urea. However, between import and retail prices there
is no evidence of cointegration for urea, while for DAP full price transmission is concluded. In the retail market,
domestic transaction costs associated with storing large volumes of fertiliser act as a buffer between import and retail
prices, especially for urea. Therefore, economic benefits could be achieved by reducing the size of stocks and revising
the demand estimation process.
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1 Introduction
Low agricultural productivity is one of the main de-
velopment challenges in sub-Saharan Africa and partic-
ularly in Ethiopia (Abebaw & Haile, 2013). Although
various measures are required to enhance agricultural
productivity, a great potential lies in increasing fertiliser
use. The current use of fertiliser in Ethiopia is only
17 kg/ha of nutrients (Spielman et al., 2011) compared
to the global average of 173 kg/ha (Hernandez & Torero,
2011). The low fertiliser use is inadequate to replenish
the nutrients removed by harvested crops (Yamano &
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Kijima, 2010). An increased and appropriate use of fer-
tiliser is expected to increase crop productivity and prof-
itability of smallholder farming, while being environ-
mentally friendly (Vanlauwe et al., 2014). The apparent
role that increased fertiliser use can play in improving
agricultural productivity has motivated the federal gov-
ernment of Ethiopia (FGov) to implement various poli-
cies in fertiliser markets.
Following the introduction of mineral fertiliser to the
country in 1967, a state monopoly prevailed in fertiliser
markets until the fall of the central planning regime
in 1991 (Matsumoto & Yamano, 2011). The follow-
ing years witnessed the market liberalisation with pri-
vate dealers controlling a significant share of the mar-
ket (Spielman et al., 2010). Between 1996 and 2000,
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companies owned by regional governments came into
play, as the regional governments believed that the pri-
vate dealers were not able to facilitate access of farmers
in remote areas to fertiliser. Due to high subsidies in-
volved in keeping these companies afloat, there was a
policy shift towards channelling fertiliser through agri-
cultural cooperatives (Rashid et al., 2013). Thus, from
2006 onwards, cooperatives became the dominant actors
in fertiliser markets (Zerfu & Larson, 2010). However,
in 2008, the FGov decided to coordinate all fertiliser im-
ports through one company in order to take advantage
of economies of scale (Kumar, 2011). Subsequently,
one importer is selected each year. Since the introduc-
tion of the policy, the Agricultural Inputs Supply Enter-
prise (AISE), a government company, has been awarded
this position every year. This arrangement reduced the
role of the cooperatives to fertiliser distribution (Rashid
et al., 2013). In addition to the de facto monopoly
created on each stage of the chain, fertiliser credit to
poor farmers and stockholding programmes were also
in place alongside with state control of prices and mar-
keting margins for fertiliser dealers.
Despite the various policy shifts that occurred, the
use of fertiliser remains low in Ethiopia. Two types
of fertiliser are mostly used in the country: diammo-
nium phosphate (DAP) and urea. These products are
entirely imported. The major cause of low fertiliser use
in Ethiopia is the high price (Dercon & Christiaensen,
2011). The retail prices of fertiliser products in Ethiopia
are two to threefold the prices on world markets (Gre-
gory & Bumb, 2006). To better understand the determi-
nants of the high price gap, a price transmission analysis
is presented in this study to assess the extent to which
fertiliser markets in Ethiopia are integrated with world
markets. Furthermore, the study analyses the effect of
current policies on the intensity of transmission of price
signals from world to domestic markets.
2 Literature review
The previous market integration and price transmis-
sion studies in Ethiopia have focused on food and cash
crops. Minot (2011) and Berweck (2010) analysed ver-
tical price transmission from world to domestic markets
for cereals during the episodes of high prices on world
markets in 2007/08. Conforti (2004), Getnet (2008),
Rashid (2011) and Jaleta & Gebremedhin (2012) eval-
uated spatial price transmission for various cereals.
Worako et al. (2008) analysed the impact of reforms of
the coffee marketing system in Ethiopia, while Alemu &
Worako (2011) analysed price transmission asymmetry
and market power exertion along the marketing system
of coffee in Ethiopia.
Unlike the agricultural outputs, agricultural inputs
have received little attention in terms of price transmis-
sion studies. In Ethiopia, no price transmission study
has been found on fertiliser. In South-Africa, Alemu
et al. (2011) observed incomplete price transmission
from world to domestic markets for four types of fer-
tiliser (DAP, muriate of potassium, ammonia and urea).
They found asymmetric price transmission and con-
cluded that most of the price gap is due to non-policy
factors such as poor infrastructure and the presence of
market power in the fertiliser market. In Asia, Dawe
(2009) showed that transmission for urea prices from the
world markets between 2003 and 2007 was high in the
Philippines and Vietnam, but low in Bangladesh, where
domestic price stabilisation policies prevented the pass-
through. However, one weakness of that study is its re-
liance on basic calculation of cumulative changes in in-
ternational and domestic prices in real terms. Thus, no
inference could be drawn about the long-run equilibrium
between world and domestic markets of urea.
There is no study addressing market integration and
price transmission for agricultural inputs in Ethiopia.
This research gap is addressed by this paper. The supply
chain of fertiliser is analysed; the price gap and the in-
tensity of price transmission in the long-run from world
markets to domestic prices in Ethiopia are investigated.
Finally, the effect of the various domestic policies on
market integration with world markets of fertiliser is
analysed.
3 Methods and data
3.1 Methods
The approach applied consists of three main meth-
ods: supply chain analysis, price gap assessment and
price transmission analysis. The supply chain analy-
sis aims at describing the chain, the actors involved and
their interactions. The information needed to understand
the structure of the supply chain of fertiliser was col-
lected through literature research and key informant in-
terviews with farmers, farmer cooperatives, the AISE,
the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), the Bu-
reaus of Agriculture (BoA), the Ethiopian Cooperative
Promotion Agency, the Ethiopian Agricultural Transfor-
mation Agency, the Ethiopian Development Research
Institute (EDRI) and the International Food Policy Re-
search Institute (IFPRI).
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The price gap is assessed in three steps. First, it is
calculated as the difference between import and world
market prices. In this sense, it covers the international
freight, insurance costs and land transportation from
Djibouti port to central warehouses in Ethiopia. Second,
the price gap between retail and import prices is com-
puted and includes domestic marketing costs and other
transaction costs incurred after fertiliser has reached the
country. Finally, the overall price gap between retail
and world market prices is calculated. This total price
gap encompasses all transaction and marketing costs in-
curred along the fertiliser supply chain.
For the price transmission analysis, dynamic regres-
sion models are used, as they allow for the time lag
inherent to transporting goods (Fackler & Goodwin,
2001). It takes about six months between the procure-
ment of fertiliser on international markets and its deliv-
ery to the users in Ethiopia. More specifically, cointe-
gration methods are used as they are able to account for
the non-stationarity characteristic of most time series of
price data (Amikuzuno & von Cramon-Taubadel, 2012).
The analysis consists of five main steps. First, the unit
root test checks whether individual price times series are
non-stationary and integrated of order one. For this pur-
pose, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is ap-
plied. Second, the Johansen-Trace test is run in order
to check for the presence of long-run equilibrium be-
tween pairs of time series. Third, the Granger causality
test is conducted and aims at identifying the lead-lag re-
lationships between two markets. This test detects the
direction of price transmission, while the vector error
correction models (VECM) needed to inform on the in-
tensity of price transmission are estimated in the fourth
step.
The VECM examine both the long-run equilibrium
and the short-run dynamics of the joint behaviour of two
time series of price data that are cointegrated of order
one. For two markets A (market of destination) and B
(market of origin), the VECM representation of price
























where pit is the (log) price on market i at time t and ∆
is the operator for the first difference between prices in
current and previous periods. γ is a (2×1) vector of con-
stants. Constants are added to the regression as prices
usually do not fluctuate around zero mean. Each Γd is
a (2 × 2) matrix of coefficients relating current and past
price changes; d is the number of lags included in the
model. In the model specification, d is chosen accord-
ing to Hannan-Quinn or Final Prediction Error selection
criteria. uAt and u
B
t are the error terms with zero mean.
αA and αB are the adjustment coefficients, which mea-
sure the responses of pAt and p
B
t to the error correction
term (ectt−1). ectt−1 measures deviations from the long-
run relationship between pAt and p
B
t and can be written
as follows:
ectt−1 = pAt−1 − (β0 + β1 ∗ pBt−1) (2)
where β0 stands for the margin between markets A and
B. β1 is the elasticity of price transmission from market
B to A. It shows the share of any shock occurring on
market B that is transmitted to A. When β1 equals 1,
price signals fully transmit from B to A. Assuming β∗1 =






























In the remaining part of this paper, markets A and B
are referred to as world, import and retail markets of
fertiliser. Finally, a residual analysis is performed on
the error terms uit to ensure that the estimated VECM
is valid. The Portmanteau test is used to check for au-
tocorrelation, Multivariate Auto-Regressive Conditional
Heteroskedastic Lagrange Multipliers (ARCH LM) for
heteroscedasticity and Jarque-Bera test for normality.
While, residual autocorrelation indicates a major model
defect, non-normal residual distribution and remaining
heteroskedasticity in residual series may not be a big
problem (Lütkepohl, 2004a,b).
All tests are performed in JMulTi 4.24 software. A
time trend is included in the model specification when
there is evidence of significant trend in the data series.
The VECM is first specified with the Johansen one stage
procedure. If full price transmission cannot be rejected
by a Wald test, the VECM is re-specified with restric-
tions in order to exclude non-significant coefficients.
Thus, the model is estimated in a two-stage procedure,
with the S2S procedure in the first stage and the GLS
procedure in the second stage. The critical value for all
tests performed is chosen at the 5 % significance level.
3.2 Data
The time series data used for the analysis emanate
from the annual prices of world, import and retail mar-
kets from 1971 to 2012. Annual prices were considered
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because the structure of the fertiliser markets is such
that the retail price is fixed, once for a whole year by
the MoA. Although price transmission studies using an-
nual data cannot capture adjustments processes that oc-
cur within days or weeks, they are a good indication of
price transmission at their level of temporal aggregation.
When a certain degree of price transmission is found in
low-frequency data such as annual data, issues that af-
fect price transmission in the short term, such as costs
of search can be ruled out (Miller & Hayenga, 2001).
Then, attention should focus on explanations based on
inventory management practices that respond only to
low frequency price changes (Meyer & von Cramon-
Taubadel, 2004).
Free on board (f.o.b.) prices at the main export ports
are collected from the World Bank commodity price
database (World Bank, 2014) as world market prices. As
import price, the cost insurance and freight (c.i.f.) price
is used, which is the price after the delivery of fertiliser
to the central warehouses in Ethiopia. In the database of
the MoA and AISE, data entries for import prices up to
2001 are in c.i.f. prices, while between 2002 and 2012,
they are in cost and freight (c.f.r.) price. The c.f.r. price
is the price at the Djibouti port. The difference between
the c.i.f. and the c.f.r. prices is largely composed of the
land transportation and the insurance between Djibouti
port and the central warehouses in Ethiopia. Therefore,
data points between 2002 and 2012 were adjusted to
have all import prices in c.i.f. equivalent prices. Re-
tail prices in this study are average prices from different
retail centres. Import prices were derived from the AISE
archives (AISE, 2013), while retail prices were assessed
from the EDRI database (EDRI, 2013) and from primary
cooperatives’ books (PC, 2013).
For the price transmission analysis, all time series
data are logarithmised, so that the estimated coeffi-
cients can be interpreted as price transmission elastic-
ities. All prices are converted to US dollar per metric
ton (USD/MT). Prices originally in Ethiopian local cur-
rency (Ethiopian birr) are converted, using the official
exchange rate published by the EDRI and the National
Bank of Ethiopia. One missing data point in the times
series of import prices for both DAP and urea was filled
by interpolation with the average of the adjacent values.
Unlike the time series data of world markets and retail
prices that start in 1971, data on import prices are avail-
able only from 1985 onwards. In the time series of retail
prices for urea, seven data points are missing between
2003 and 2012. For some of them, both adjacent values
are missing. Hence, the interpolation procedure cannot
be applied. Therefore, it was decided to truncate the
time series at 2002 to avoid including many computed
data in the time series. As a result, the length of the
times series used in this study is 28 annual observations
for DAP and 18 for urea.
4 Results
4.1 The fertiliser marketing chain
There are four main functions along the supply chain
of fertiliser in Ethiopia: import planning and inven-
tory control, import execution, marketing and distribu-
tion, and final use. The import planning consists in
assessing the demand before the procurement. It is a
bottom-up approach through which farmers’ demand is
collected by extension workers and is progressively ag-
gregated at district, zone and region levels by the re-
spective Bureaus of Agriculture (BoA). The final aggre-
gation occurs at the national level by the Agricultural
Inputs Marketing Directorate of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture (AIMD/MoA). However, in practice, many manipu-
lations occur in the process. Some extension workers do
not collect farmers’ demand and instead report their own
estimates. For this reason, BoA officers are reluctant
to use these estimates. Moreover, BoA officers assume
that with the sustained extension effort, farmers will use
more fertiliser than the figures reported by the extension
workers. Subsequently, they make assumptions over fer-
tiliser rates farmers would apply to estimate the fertiliser
demand. After aggregation at the national level and con-
sideration of stocks in central warehouses, the import
schedule is prepared by the AIMD.
Import execution is implemented by the sole im-
porter, AISE. International suppliers are invited through
a competitive tendering process. Winning suppliers are
selected by an inter-ministerial committee. As Ethiopia
is a landlocked country, ports of neighbouring countries
are used. The nearest ports are Djibouti and Assab (Er-
itrea). However, due to political conflict with Eritrea,
the main port for Ethiopian imports is Djibouti. Inter-
national suppliers deliver the fertiliser to Djibouti port
under the supervision of AISE, which conducts the cus-
toms clearing. From the port, AISE transports the sup-
plies to central warehouses with large capacity inside
Ethiopia. The following warehouses are considered for
the main agricultural regions of the country: Adama and
Sashemene for the Southern region, Adama and Bahir
Dar for the Amhara Region (North-West), Addis Ababa,
Adama, Mojo and Debre Zeit for the Oromia region
(Centre) and Mekele for the Tigray region (North-East)
(see Figure 1a 1). Fertiliser distribution is conducted by
1Mojo, and Debre Zeit were not represented in Figure 1 for clarity
reasons because they are very close to Addis Ababa and Adama
J. U. I. Agbahey et al. / J. Agr. Rural Develop. Trop. Subtrop. 116 - 2 (2015) 213–226 217
a. Flow from world markets to central warehouses b. Flow from central warehouses to primary
cooperatives (PC)
Fig. 1: Map of fertiliser flow in Ethiopia
Source: Own illustration
agricultural cooperatives. Cooperative unions (CUs) op-
erate at district (woreda) level. They receive their quotas
of fertiliser from the MoA and the BoAs at the central
warehouses. Although they keep part of their supply in
their own warehouses, most of it is directly transported
from the central warehouses to primary cooperatives
(PCs). Each CU is mandated to supply all PCs in its
coverage area with specific quotas assigned by the MoA
and the BoAs. PCs cover one or several sub-districts
(kebele). The transporters are selected based on a ten-
der floating process conducted by the zonal BoAs on
behalf of the CUs. This intervention of the zonal BoA
is necessitated by the lack of skills of CU managers in
dealing with such a process. The flow of fertiliser from
the central warehouses to the PCs is depicted in Figure
1b. This figure shows the flow in the Arsi zone, which
belongs to the Oromia region, where two districts were
sampled for this study. Each of these districts is covered
by a CU (Hitosa CU for Hitosa district and Gaalamaa
CU for L. Bilbiloo district). Within each district, one
PC is illustrated.
The CUs as well as the PCs are supplied with fer-
tiliser on credit, which is guaranteed by the regional
governments’ budgets. This credit is based at the Com-
mercial Bank of Ethiopia, a government bank, which
settles a letter of credit to pay the international suppli-
ers and the AISE. The PCs, after receiving their quo-
tas, make the fertiliser available to farmers at a fixed
retail price, which is a weighted average of the new
supply’s price and the price of the old stock. The new
supply price is made up of the initial c.f.r. price, trans-
portation costs, loading and unloading costs, warehouse
rental costs, spillage and inventory costs, and marketing
margins for AISE, CUs and PCs. Some cost items like
the marketing margins, loading, bagging, and spillage
costs are set by the MoA and the BoAs. The marketing
margins in 2013 for instance were set at 0.84 USD/MT
for AISE, 3.09 USD/MT for CUs and 5.05 USD/MT for
PCs. Other cost items such as transportation between
Djibouti port are taken from the service providers and
their average is computed at the regional level. As fer-
tiliser is supplied to the cooperatives on credit, they are
charged 9.5 % nominal interest rate to be reimbursed
with the credit capital within 6 months. The old stock
price includes the storage costs and the initial price of
the fertiliser purchased in the previous year. Because the
government is implementing fertiliser stockholding pro-
grammes, stocks in some years are large and their costs
significantly influence the final weighted average retail
price. Transportation costs from central warehouses to
each PC are added to the weighted price computed at
the regional level so as to arrive at the final retail price
at each PC.
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Smallholder farmers are the main users of fertiliser
products in Ethiopia. They purchase exclusively from
the PCs, since private retailers are not authorized to sell
fertiliser anymore and illegal trade is punishable by im-
prisonment. Since 2011, most farmers purchase fer-
tiliser on cash basis. However, in very remote and poor
areas, there is a programme to provide farmers with fer-
tiliser on credit. Most farmers use DAP, but only a few
use urea. In the Arsi zone, for instance, the farmer sur-
vey conducted for this study showed that all farmers use
DAP, but only 25 % of them use urea. Figure 2 illustrates
the supply chain of fertiliser in Ethiopia. The actors op-
erating each chain function are represented below the
respective function. The main tasks performed by each
actor in connection with the chain function are briefly
described below each actor.
4.2 Price gap analysis
The total price gap is higher for urea than for DAP
(Table 1). The world market price makes up about two
thirds of the retail price for DAP, while for urea, it only
makes up one third of the retail price. The costs asso-
ciated with the domestic transactions form about half of
the retail price of urea, while they are only one sixth of
the retail price of DAP. This difference is first related to
the fact that urea is less consumed by farmers and this
often results in large left-over stocks. Hence, the storage
costs significantly increase its domestic costs. Addition-
ally, cost items such as internal transportation, market-
ing margins and warehouse rental that are the same in
absolute terms for urea and DAP, are higher for urea if
expressed as a proportion of the retail price, since the
retail price of urea is lower than that of DAP.
Most of the domestic costs are associated with the
transportation of fertiliser, interest payments and the
storage costs. Marketing margins received by the co-
operatives are only a small fraction of the price gap.
The marketing margins are set by the MoA at break-
even costs assuming that cooperatives aim at helping
farmers and do not seek profit. Similarly, the marketing
margins for the AISE are also set at the break-even cost
by the MoA, assuming that the AISE as a government
company does not seek profit. Altogether, the market-
ing margins received by the AISE and the cooperatives
made up 3.2 % of the total price gap for DAP and 3.9 %
of the total price gap of urea in 2012.
Fig. 2: Fertiliser supply chain functions in Ethiopia
Source: Own illustration
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Table 1: Price gap summary, average prices from 1971 to 2012
DAP Urea
Average world market price (WP) in USD/MT 264.92 110.09
Average import price (IP) in USD/MT 347.38 150.59
Average retail price (RP) in USD/MT 410.21 294.18
Average total price gap (TPG = RP-WP) in USD/MT 145.28 184.09
Average international transaction costs (IT= IP-WP) in USD/MT 82.45 40.50
Average domestic transaction costs (DT=RP-IP) in USD/MT 62.83 143.59
DT as share of RP 15.3 % 48.8 %
IT as share of RP 20.1 % 13.8 %
WP as share of RP 64.6 % 37.4 %
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2014), AISE (2013), EDRI (2013), PC (2013).
4.3 Price transmission analysis
Time series data for world market, import and retail
prices of DAP and urea are depicted in Figure 3. In Fig-
ure 3a, there is a noticeable peak in 2007/08 followed by
another one of lower magnitude in 2011. These peaks
show that the surge in world market prices observed in
these periods for a large range of commodities also oc-
curred on fertiliser markets. As shown by the graphs,
price volatility on world markets affects both import and
retail prices. However, it can be observed in Figure 3a
that the magnitude of the peaks and troughs between
2006 and 2009 on the world markets was more pro-
nounced than on the domestic markets. This suggests
that some price stabilisation policies were implemented
on the domestic markets.
The ADF test (Table 2) shows that each time series
is non-stationary and integrated of order one. The null
hypothesis of non-stationarity fails to be rejected in the
level data but is rejected in the first differences.
Results of the Johansen trace test (Table 3) suggest
that for DAP, all pairs of time series of prices have one
cointegrating vector. However, for urea, only pairs of
world market and import prices as well as world market
and retail prices are found to be cointegrated. No evi-
dence for cointegration between import and retail prices
could be found and therefore, this market pair is ex-
cluded from further analyses.
For DAP, the Granger causality test (Table 4) points
out unidirectional lead-lag relation from import to re-
tail price and from import to world market price. The
results also indicate an overall unidirectional lead-lag
relation from world market to retail prices. For urea,
the results suggest that the import price leads the world
market price, which leads the retail price.
More detailed information on the price transmission
intensity is provided by the VECM analysis. For DAP
(Table 5), the VECM results suggest an incomplete price
transmission from the world market to the import price.
The adjustment coefficient αimport being not signifi-
cantly different from zero suggests that the import price
does not react to deviations from the long-run equilib-
rium. Counterintuitively, αworld is significantly different
from zero, implying that the world market price reacts to
deviations from the long-run equilibrium. The value of
β0 indicates the presence of a long-run margin between
world market and import prices. Assuming a world mar-
ket price of 100 USD/MT, this would result in an import
price of 151 USD/MT (e0.97 ∗ (100)0.88 = 151).
Between import and retail prices, the VECM results
indicate perfect price transmission, with only the retail
price of DAP reacting to changes in the long-run price
equilibrium. The value of β0 implies a long-run mar-
gin between import and retail prices of 34 % of the im-
port price. The overall transmission from the world mar-
ket to the retail price is complete. The coefficient α retail
is significantly different from zero implying that the re-
tail price of DAP reacts to deviations from the long-run
price equilibrium, while the world market price does not
react. The value of β0 implies a long-run margin of 88 %
of the world market price.
For urea, the results of the VECM show that the null
hypothesis of full price transmission from world market
to import prices is rejected. Only αworld is significantly
different from zero, implying that the world market price
reacts to deviation from the long-run equilibrium. The
value of β0 suggests the presence of a long run mar-
gin. Assuming a world market price of 100 USD/MT,
this would cause an import price of 135 USD/MT. Fur-
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a. DAP b. Urea
Fig. 3: World market, import and retail prices
Source: World Bank (2014), AISE (2013), EDRI (2013), PC (2013)
Table 2: ADF test for time series of DAP and urea prices.
Commodity Time series data
Level data First differences
Number of lags Value of t-statistic Number of lags Value of t-statistic
DAP World market price 0 –2.60 1 –6.00 *
Import price 2 –0.14 1 –5.72 *
Retail price 3 –1.87 2 –3.15 *
Urea World market price 2 –2.41 1 –6.06 *
Import price 3 –0.73 1 –5.12 *
Retail price 1 –2.47 1 –4.19 *
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2014), AISE (2013), EDRI (2013), PC (2013).
Critical values for the ADF test are: –2.57 (10 %), –2.86 (5 %) and –3.43 (1 %).
Number of lags selected according to Hannan-Quinn Criterion
* Rejection of H0 of non-stationarity at 5 % level of significance.
Table 3: Johansen-Trace test for DAP and urea prices.


















r0≤1 0.08 r0≤1 0.21




r0≤1 0.35 r0≤1 –





r0≤1 0.24 r0≤1 0.44
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2014), AISE (2013), EDRI (2013), PC (2013).
Number of lags selected according to Hannan-Quinn criterion
* Rejection of H0 of no cointegration at 5 % level of significance.
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World price does not Granger cause import price 0.45 0.19
Import price does not Granger cause world price 0.00 * 0.00 *
Import price does not Granger cause retail price 0.00 * –
Retail price does not Granger cause import price 0.14 –
World price does not Granger cause retail price 0.00 * 0.00 *
Retail price does not Granger cause world price 0.33 0.32
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2014), AISE (2013), EDRI (2013), PC (2013).
Number of lags selected according to Hannan-Quinn criterion
* Rejection of H0 at 5 % level of significance.
Table 5: Restricted VECM coefficients for DAP and urea prices.








αworld αimport αretail β1 β0
DAP
World market and import prices 2 FPE 1.12 * –0.69 0.88 0.97
Import and retail prices 6 FPE –1.27 –0.49 * 1.00 0.29
Retail and world market prices 1 HQ 0.00 –0.21 * 1.00 0.63
Urea
World market and import prices 8 FPE 2.25 * 0.00 1.18 –0.53
Retail and world market prices 4 FPE 0.00 –0.50 * 0.28 4.40
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2014), AISE (2013), EDRI (2013), PC (2013).
HQ Number of lags selected according to Hannan-Quinn criterion
FPE Number of lags selected according to Final Prediction Error criterion when the number of lags suggested by HQ criterion is too
large to allow the model to run.
* Rejection of H0 of α=0 at 5 % level of significance.
Table 6: Results of VECM checking for pairs of prices of DAP and urea.










World market and import prices 0.99 0.00 * 0.56 0.51
Import and retail prices 0.96 0.91 0.38 0.35
Retail and world market prices 0.99 0.78 0.00 * 0.02 *
Urea World market and import prices 0.96 0.53 0.75 0.35
Retail and world market prices 0.98 0.77 0.38 0.17
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2014), AISE (2013), EDRI (2013), PC (2013).
* Rejection of H0 at 5 % level of significance.
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thermore, the hypothesis of full price transmission from
world market to retail price has to be rejected. Nonethe-
less, αretail is significantly different from zero, suggest-
ing that the retail price reacts to changes in the long-
run equilibrium. Assuming a world market price of 100
USD/MT, the value of β0 suggests a retail price of 296
USD/MT.
The residual analysis for the two models (Table 6)
shows non-normality and heteroskedasticity problems
being partially present in the first and the third model
estimated for DAP. However, since no autocorrelation
problem is found in any of the models, all estimated
VECM are considered to be overall valid.
5 Discussion
The overall price gap between world and retail prices
shows that the retail price of urea is almost threefold
its world market price, while the retail price of DAP is
about 1.5 times its world market price. The long-run
margins estimated by the VECM suggest a similar price
gap in the case of urea, and a larger one for DAP, for
which the retail price is estimated to be about twofold
the world market price. In general, these findings are in
line with the results of Gregory & Bumb (2006), who
found that the retail prices of fertiliser in Ethiopia were
two to threefold the world market price levels. The price
gap analysis also indicates that the world market price
is the largest component of the retail price for DAP and
the second largest for urea. Marketing margins received
by the importer and the distributors of fertiliser make
up a small fraction of the total price gap. These find-
ings suggest that fertiliser prices in Ethiopia are compet-
itive. They compare favourably with prices in other East
African countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and
Tanzania (Rashid et al., 2013). According to Heisey &
Norton (2007), domestic costs associated with fertiliser
in Ethiopia are comparable with those found in other
African countries, though higher than those observed in
Asian and Latin American countries.
The study shows that a price hike on international and
Ethiopian fertiliser markets occurred during the food
price crisis of 2007/08. The driving factor for this surge
in fertiliser prices on world markets was the rise in en-
ergy prices (Headey & Fan, 2008). Because fertiliser
production is highly energy-intensive, fertiliser prices
roughly quadrupled during the crisis. The finding that
the magnitude of the price change was higher on world
markets than on domestic markets can be attributed to
the implementation of various price stabilisation poli-
cies by the FGov. First, on the onset of the crisis, the
government put in place a tariff exemption on fertiliser
in addition to the existing indirect import subsidies that
were allocated to the CUs through the credit lines guar-
anteed by the regional governments. In case of payment
default, the regional governments were prompted to fill
the gap. Another measure enacted by the FGov after
the price spike of 2007 was the sole importer policy
described in section 1. Despite the de facto monopoly
created on the import market, this measure enabled the
government to exercise a greater control over price and
quantity of imported fertiliser. This government con-
trol contributed to limit the pass-through of price shocks
from world to domestic markets.
On the retail market, the magnitude of the price spike
and the shape of the retail price curve can be understood
in light of price stabilisation and fertiliser subsidy poli-
cies implemented by the government. First, the gov-
ernment released its buffer stocks in order to stabilise
fertiliser prices. Second, like for imports, there were
also indirect subsidies on the retail market. Fertiliser
was distributed to farmers on credit guaranteed by the
government budget. In case of default, the regional gov-
ernments would make up for the loss. The fact that the
magnitude of the shock was higher on the world mar-
ket than on the import and the retail markets suggests
that the policies implemented by the government were
effective to some extent. However, to gain deeper in-
sights into this, one would need high frequency time
series and a sufficient number of observations in order
to include a structural break in the price transmission
model. Such analyses conducted in Bolivia and Vietnam
showed however that policies aiming at preventing the
transmission of the price shock from world to domes-
tic markets during the 2007/08 price spike were mostly
ineffective for both imported and exported commodities
(Luckmann et al., 2014; Schüttel et al., 2011).
For DAP, the Granger causality test for the model esti-
mated between world market and import prices suggests
that the world market price reacts to the import price.
This counterintuitive result is confirmed by a visual ob-
servation of Figure 3a, which shows that the import
price peaks before the world market price. It is also con-
firmed by the adjustment coefficients estimated in the
VECM analysis, which indicate that only the world mar-
ket price reacts to deviations from the long-run equilib-
rium. These results are the opposite of what one would
expect. According to by Gregory & Bumb (2006), the
total fertiliser market in all sub-Saharan African coun-
tries represents less than 1 % of the global fertiliser mar-
ket. Thus Ethiopia, which constitutes only a fraction of
this market share is too small a player to influence world
market prices. However, two explanations can be pro-
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vided. First, the results could be interpreted in light of
the structure of the Ethiopian fertiliser markets. Indeed,
the import price reflects international suppliers’ expec-
tations about future world market prices. When bidding
prices in response to the tenders floated usually in Au-
gust by the AISE and the AIMD, the international sup-
pliers try to anticipate prices that would prevail at the de-
livery time in January-February of the next year. Thus,
when prices started to soar on world markets, inter-
national suppliers immediately and exorbitantly raised
their prices. This anticipation mechanism could explain
the rejection of the hypothesis of full price transmission
from world market to import prices, as the expectations
do not completely match the real price development.
The second explanation is that the data may be flawed.
The data used in this study may suffer from inconsis-
tency because they were taken from different sources,
mostly unpublished reports.
The result of the Granger causality test between im-
port and retail prices is in line with expectations and
shows that the import price leads the retail price. This
result is confirmed by the VECM analysis, which shows
that only the retail price reacts to changes from the long-
run equilibrium. The model indicates full price trans-
mission from import to retail prices. Thus, the domes-
tic policies do not hinder the cointegration of domestic
and world markets of DAP. Finally, the retail price fol-
lows the world market price, as expected. Only the retail
price reacts to deviations from the long-run equilibrium.
Price signals are fully transmitted from world market to
retail prices. Thus, a good overall integration of domes-
tic markets with world markets for DAP is concluded.
For urea, the Johansen-Trace test shows no evidence
of cointegration between import and retail prices, in-
dicating that there is no long-run equilibrium between
these prices. The absence of a long-run equilibrium can
be interpreted in light of the fertiliser demand process
and farmers’ demand for urea. In fact, the demand es-
timation process, which assumes that farmers apply fer-
tiliser according to the recommended application rates,
has often overestimated the demand for urea. In con-
trast to DAP, the application of urea is optional for most
farmers as their soils are sufficient in nitrogen. Thus,
they do not buy as much urea as planned by officers in
charge of demand estimation. As a result, there are large
left-over stocks of urea. The current demand estimation
procedure based on official targets instead of actual de-
mand and the monopoly in supply do not provide incen-
tives to the actors to improve the management of inven-
tories. Moreover, only stocks at central warehouses are
taken into account when estimating the final procure-
ment needs, while left-over stocks at PC and CU level
even exceed stocks at central warehouse level. Storage
costs related to these stocks strongly influence the retail
price for urea. Subsequently, there is a fluctuating price
margin associated with the stocks that keeps the retail
price disconnected from the import price.
The Granger causality test between world market and
import prices for urea shows that the world market price
follows the import price. The transmission elasticity is
found to be 1.18, which means that a price change on
international markets is amplified domestically. As for
DAP, these results could be interpreted by the antici-
pation mechanism of future prices on world markets or
by the flaw in the data. The Granger causality test also
shows that the world market price leads the retail price
of urea, as one would expect. The hypothesis of perfect
price transmission is rejected. The large stocks of urea,
which keep the retail price disconnected from the import
price also explain the absence of perfect price transmis-
sion from the world market to retail prices. In contrast to
the case of South Africa (Alemu et al., 2011), this study
shows that for urea, policy factors play a significant role
in the price gap and the pass-through of price shocks in
Ethiopia.
State intervention in fertiliser markets and especially
in urea markets in Ethiopia comes at a cost for both
farmers and the government. Farmers have to pay high
retail prices because of the bad management of invento-
ries. For the government, Rashid et al. (2013) showed
that fertiliser promotion involved about US$ 40 million
per year as fiscal costs since 2008 (the year of policy
shift towards more state control). Therefore, policy op-
tions should seek ways to optimize stocks, reduce gov-
ernment intervention in the markets and improve the
supply chain.
6 Conclusion
This study shows that government policy plays an im-
portant role on fertiliser markets in Ethiopia. Between
world markets and import prices, the high transmission
observed suggests that the procurement of fertiliser on
international markets in Ethiopia is competitive and that
domestic markets on the import side are well integrated
with world markets. However, between import and retail
prices, government policy led to a mixed result. While
for DAP perfect price transmission from import to retail
price is observed, there is no evidence of cointegration
between import and retail prices for urea. In the case
of DAP, the estimated demand often matches the actual
demand, as farmers use it intensively. Thus, stocks are
kept at acceptable levels and do not prevent the trans-
mission of price signals from import to retail prices.
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However, in case of urea, which is less intensively used
by farmers, the mismatch between estimated and actual
demand has resulted in the accumulation of large stocks.
The biased demand estimation procedure based on as-
sumptions instead of farmers’ need, combined with the
state of monopoly that does not provide incentives for
an efficient inventory management lead to high storage
costs that are translated into the retail price in the fol-
lowing year. This keeps the retail price disconnected
from the new import price.
In light of these results, different policy options could
improve fertiliser markets in Ethiopia. The first option
is to improve the demand estimation procedure. First,
inventories at central warehouses as well as at cooper-
ative level should to be incorporated into the final pro-
curement need estimation. Moreover, the stockholding
programme needs to be revised so as to minimize stocks,
especially for urea. Additionally, transparency and trust
should be enhanced along the demand estimation pro-
cess. Extension workers in charge of collecting farm-
ers’ demand should report reliable figures to be used at
higher levels when estimating demand. The officers at
higher levels should make their estimation procedures
transparent and derive their assumptions from research-
based evidence regarding the potential of extension ser-
vices to increase fertiliser use in the context of Ethiopia.
Another policy option is to allow private dealers to dis-
tribute fertiliser alongside the cooperatives. This option
is likely to result in competitive pressure driving down
prices, while optimizing inventories and improving the
transmission of price signals. Competing private dealers
seeking ways to maximize their profits are likely to opti-
mize stock levels which could reduce retail prices. This
point is supported by evidence in neighbouring Kenya
and Uganda where following the liberalisation of fer-
tiliser markets, increasing competition and falling prices
of fertiliser were observed.
The work presented here could be extended in three
main directions. First, similar analyses could be con-
ducted in countries such as Kenya and Uganda, where
fertiliser markets have been liberalised. Comparison
across countries will provide a basis for more defini-
tive judgments about which setting between strong state
control over fertiliser markets, like in Ethiopia, and free
markets results in a higher transmission of price signals.
Second, in countries where fertiliser procurement is not
conducted only once in a year and retail prices fixed
accordingly, time series with more observations would
make it possible to look at adjustment dynamics and to
estimate models that allow for threshold effects, struc-
tural breaks and for asymmetry in price transmission.
Finally, a study could focus on the stock optimisation
and demand estimation problems in Ethiopia. Using lin-
ear programming methods, such study could come up
with a model to optimize stock levels and reconcile offi-
cial targets and actual demand for fertiliser.
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